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ABSTRACT
This article revisits democratic engagement in post-war Britain in a 
context of debates about political disaffection in the current period. 
The study systematically reanalysed volunteer writing in the Mass 
Observation Archive and represents a significant methodological 
advance on previous studies. Little evidence was found to support 
common existing interpretations: whether ‘golden age’ narratives of 
deference to authority, partisan alignment and high voter turnout 
or revisionist accounts of apathy. Instead, evidence was found of 
something akin to what Hibbing and Theiss-Morse call ‘stealth 
democracy’. Citizens thought democracy to be important and felt a 
duty to vote, but wished for government by experts in the national 
interest. This ‘stealth’ interpretation builds on existing studies of 
duty, populism and expertise in twentieth-century Britain. It helps to 
move discussion of democratic engagement after the Second World 
War beyond the binaries of self/collective and private/public, and to 
explain the paradox of high voter turnout in a context of hostility 
to party politics. It also promises to inform debates about declining 
political support in the current period.
Looking back from the ‘Age of Anti-politics’
Historians need to keep revisiting the formal politics of post-war Britain, not least because 
it is often positioned, implicitly or explicitly, as a ‘golden age’ in debates about rising political 
disaffection. These debates are informed by a large literature in Political Science on declining 
satisfaction with government, trust in politicians, interest in formal politics, membership of 
political parties and turnout in elections.1 In the build up to the 2015 General Election, such 
debates gave rise to claims by journalists of an ‘age of anti-politics’, when voters feel discon-
nected from politics and angry with politicians, while politicians feel insecure in the face of 
such anger, or an ‘era of anti-politics’, when citizens don’t join political parties, don’t trust 
politicians, feel alienated from politics, feel that Westminster is powerless to effect mean-
ingful change, turn to small parties, prefer their MPs to be more constituency-focused and 
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prefer coalition government to majority government.2 Of course, these debates also include 
other positions. Historians of popular politics have claimed that public apathy and cynicism 
towards formal politics are by no means new.3 Meanwhile, some have understood withdrawal 
from formal politics as part of a public reorientation of political engagement that has increas-
ingly centred on citizens’ private interests and participation in new social movements and 
non-governmental organisations since the Second World War.4 In the context of these 
debates, it remains important for historians to continue investigating citizen engagement 
with formal politics, asking what formal politics meant to citizens in the past and what and 
how citizens thought about democracy.
The next section summarises the historiography. Existing interpretations of popular pol-
itics between 1945 and 1950 have generally been divided between narratives of a ‘golden 
age’, emphasising high levels of voter turnout, party membership and support for the two 
main parties, and revisionist accounts of apathy, focusing on the prevalence of self-interest, 
cynicism and anti-party feeling evidenced in the press and opinion polls. This article aims 
to supplement existing accounts by identifying popular understandings of democracy pres-
ent in the writing of respondents to Mass Observation (MO). Our first contribution is meth-
odological. Existing accounts of political engagement in the post-war period have drawn 
on MO as a source of contemporary attitudes and opinion, utilising the organisation’s File 
Reports, Topic Collections or Publications. We move beyond these significantly mediated 
syntheses of volunteer writing and return to the ‘raw data’. We propose a ‘horizontal’ way of 
reading MO material to identify the cultural resources respondents used and shared with 
each other—and, plausibly, with citizens more broadly—as they constructed and expressed 
their understandings, expectations and judgements of politics and democracy.
We identify a discursive repertoire used by many respondents when writing about formal 
politics. This was made up of numerous cultural resources or categories. Two main stories 
were that democracy was important and party politics was unnecessary. These narratives 
were constituted by numerous storylines, including that citizens had a duty to participate, 
and party politics was little more than mud-slinging. They were also populated by numerous 
prototypical characters, including the independent candidate and the statesman.
The concluding section discusses these findings in relation to existing interpretations of 
post-war democratic engagement. Historians often describe the combination of negativity 
towards politicians and high levels of political participation during this period as a paradox.5 
But focusing on the raw data of MO makes visible how this apparent contradiction between 
attitudes and behaviour made sense to citizens at the time. They viewed their own interests 
as part of a common local or national interest. They did not operate with binaries of self/
collective and private/public. They expressed negativity towards politics and politicians, but 
not a desire for more participatory democracy. We suggest that Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s 
writing on stealth democracy provides a useful framework in which to view democratic 
engagement at this moment in contemporary British history, a short period when people 
held negative views about formal politics but participated in representative democracy to 
an extent not witnessed since. Stealth democracy, for Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, is a folk 
theory of how democracy does or should work. Political debate is understood by citizens to 
be not only unpleasant but also pointless because consensus is presumed to exist about 
the common good. Within this model, government is expected to make decisions based on 
objective knowledge and expertise, rather than personal or partisan interests.6 From reading 
MO materials, we find a rejection of party politics and a preference for independent 
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‘statesmen’, which we argue reflected a wider preference for stealth democracy shared 
among British citizens during the immediate post-war period. By focusing on citizens’ folk 
theories of democracy, we move debates beyond the question of participation versus apathy. 
We show that deference and partisanship have been significantly overestimated for this 
period. And we help explain the paradox, commonly perceived, between hostility towards 
party politics and popular support for representative democracy after the Second World 
War.
1945–1950: ‘Golden Age’ or ‘Age of Apathy’?
The 1945 General Election is widely understood as a significant turning point in modern 
British history. Labour won their first ever majority government and introduced a wide-rang-
ing programme of social and economic reform, establishing the foundations of a political 
consensus that was sustained until the 1970s. Historical accounts of popular politics in the 
immediate post-war period have focused on questions of why Labour won the election in 
1945, before losing in 1951 and the impact of the Second World War on political attitudes.
For some, the 1945 election represented the beginning of a ‘golden age’ for British politics. 
By comparison to the present period, turnout was high and support for the two main parties 
was high. It was estimated that 45 per cent of the public listened to election broadcasts on 
the radio and large numbers flocked to outdoor meetings to see politicians in the flesh.7 
Party membership grew to unprecedented levels.8 In 1951, turnout reached a record high 
of 91 per cent (adjusted) and support for the two main parties reached 97 per cent.9 For 
historians on the left, Labour’s first parliamentary majority represented the highpoint of 
post-war enthusiasm and consensus for social democracy. The ‘people’s war’ strengthened 
left-wing feeling and produced a sense of national purpose and social reconciliation, not 
least through conscription, evacuation, rationing and communal air-raid shelters. Labour’s 
victory was a consequence of greater public engagement and support for collectivism, plan-
ning and egalitarian principles.10 Some argue that Labour did not go far enough to meet 
the new demands of the radicalised electorate.11
This ‘golden age’ interpretation of the immediate post-war period forms one basis for 
theories in Political Studies about the decline of deference and partisan dealignment. The 
former holds that affluence and rising living standards transformed the relationship between 
citizens and the state in post-war industrial democracies.12 Better-educated citizens with 
‘post-material’ values are understood to have become less accepting of ‘traditional’ social 
and political authorities, and more likely to engage in elite challenging forms of politics.13 
Partisan dealignment connects declining political support to an erosion of citizens’ partisan 
identities in the second half of the twentieth century.14 Both theories appear to assume that 
citizens operated with higher levels of respect for political authorities and a deeper attach-
ment to political parties in the 1940s than in the current period.
Steven Fielding and colleagues have questioned this ‘golden age’ narrative and especially 
the idea that war politicised the electorate.15 They argue that voters turned to Labour as a 
reaction against the Conservatives, rather than as ‘a tidal wave of left-wing fervour’.16 The 
‘spirit of 1945’ was a myth and few people voted for Labour because they desired socialism 
or social democracy.17 Citizens supported the implementation of the 1942 Beveridge Report 
out of individual self-interest and were indifferent to broader projects of social transforma-
tion. In the words of Fielding et al., ‘most people remained preoccupied with their private 
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spheres’ and ‘uninterested in wider events’.18 According to this interpretation, citizens ‘turned 
away from party politics’; they were dispirited, unfocused and operated under ‘a cloak of 
apathy’.19 The implications of this argument extend into the post-war period. It is suggested 
that Labour’s failure to establish democratic socialism as a dominant force in British politics 
resulted not from the party’s failure but from the reluctance of British citizens to support a 
participatory political culture.20
This revisionist interpretation of post-war popular politics has been labelled ‘the apathy 
school’ by James Hinton, who criticises it for its binary division between personal concerns 
or private ends on the one hand, and big issues or political abstractions or the public realm 
or the public good on the other—noting how there is no clear division between the two 
sets, with the latter often constituting a means to pursuing the former (and so not necessarily 
evidence of apathy).21 More recently, there has been a reassertion that popular opinion 
swung to the left during the war and that Labour won by successfully identifying itself with 
popular dissatisfaction with the pre-war social order and popular aspirations for a more 
egalitarian and democratic political nation.22 Responses to ‘the apathy school’ have demon-
strated that popular support for the Labour party was more widespread than Fielding et al. 
suggest, citing opinion polls and the lack of tactical voting against Conservative candidates 
as evidence.23 Labour won the election by appealing to an alliance of progressive mid-
dle-class ‘workers by brain’ and ‘workers by hand’, who made an active choice to vote Labour 
because they believed the party would improve their experiences of inter-war insecurity.24 
Post-war austerity, the loss of domestic servants and the growing assertiveness of organised 
labour generated an anti-socialist reaction from the middle classes who voted Conservative 
in 1950 and 1951.25
To date, historical analyses have focused on citizens’ attitudes towards specific political 
parties and ideologies, apathy has been measured in terms of popular support for parties 
and policies and analysis has relied on newspapers, popular literature, opinion polls, surveys 
and some relatively unsystematic treatment of MO materials. Kevin Jefferys has provided a 
useful synthesis of survey data and existing studies of political attitudes and levels of par-
ticipation from the Great War to the present day.26 He argues that Britain never possessed a 
vibrant political culture and there has been no decline from some ‘golden age’ to a contem-
porary period of crisis.27 In doing so, however, Jefferys draws heavily on Fielding et al., using 
that same binary division criticised by Hinton; in this case, between personal things or private 
affairs or issues of immediate relevance on the one hand, and political abstractions or public 
affairs or the great issues of the day on the other.28 This division obscures the possibility that 
citizens may imagine their own personal interests to be shared by other members of a sin-
gular public—something we return to below. It also reflects the categories of commentators 
at the time, including MO researchers, which may not have been the same as the categories 
of many citizens. In all this, the idea that citizens could hold their own understandings of 
and expectations for democracy remains unexplored. The remainder of this article focuses 
on theories of democracy evident in the relatively unmediated volunteer writing of MO 
panellists.
Rereading Mass Observation
MO was a social research organisation established in 1937 by Tom Harrison, Charles Madge 
and Humphrey Jennings with the aim of developing ‘a science of ourselves’. MO conducted 
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research into everyday life in Britain by two primary means: first, through a team of research-
ers who carried out questionnaires, interviews and participant observation studies in par-
ticular communities and second, through a panel of volunteer writers who recorded diaries 
and day surveys, and responded to monthly open-ended questions called ‘directives’. Laura 
Beers connects the organisation to the inception of opinion polling in British politics. 
Launched in the same year as the British Index of Public Opinion (BIPO), MO claimed to offer 
a ‘scientific understanding’ of public opinion on politics and a multitude of other social and 
cultural issues.29 As a result, material from the MO archive has been used as evidence of 
political attitudes in the past, albeit in a relatively unsystematic way.
For example, Fielding et al. and Jefferys both draw on material collected by MO to con-
struct their accounts of political engagement in the immediate post-war period from the 
perspective of ‘ordinary people’ or ‘the population at large’.30 Both use a combination of File 
Reports and Topic Collections, alongside opinion polls and social surveys. We see two prob-
lems with this approach. First, these sources only provide a mediated and brief glimpse into 
what is a vast and complex body of heterogeneous data. File Reports provide top-level 
summaries and conclusions of the findings of each MO study. According to Tom Jeffrey, 
‘these reports were based on a minute part of the raw material now available in the archive’.31 
Topic Collections contain the data MO researchers selected as evidence to use in their pub-
lished studies, including a range of questionnaire responses, interview responses, overheards 
and ephemera.32 Such collections of material have been criticised because they are more 
likely to reflect the views and values of the MO researcher than of those being observed.33
The second problem with this approach is the premise that such material could provide 
a direct window onto the political views of ‘ordinary people’. It has been well established 
that participants in MO were anything but ‘ordinary’.34 Almost by definition, they were par-
ticularly dutiful citizens. It is therefore unsurprising to find that participants expressed dismay 
at the apathy of their fellow citizens, which was reflected in the conclusions of MO’s own 
publications, and again in those of historians relying on these publications.35 yet, such crit-
icisms do not mean that material from MO cannot offer insights into popular understandings 
of politics in the past. We now explain how this might be so by discussing strategies for 
sampling and analysis of MO data.
Between 1945 and 1950, MO asked its panel of volunteer writers to record their engage-
ments with and thoughts and feelings about politics on 22 separate occasions. The panel 
varied in size from 400 to 1000 writers during this period. Open-ended directives asked for 
panellists’ views on elections, political parties, politicians and local councils. For this article, 
we selected eight of these directives for analysis, listed below in Table 1. They include direc-
tives asking about politics in general, excluding those asking about just one politician, party 
or government (e.g. ‘the current Labour Government’)—because we are interested in declin-
ing support for political institutions more than public opinion regarding particular actors. 
We also avoided directives where questions were repeated from previous directives within 
only a year or two of those questions having been asked, not least to keep the data-set at a 
manageable size. By focusing on the raw data—the responses of MO panellists, relatively 
unmediated by researchers of the time—our approach is significantly different to previous 
studies of political attitudes found in MO.
Some will remain concerned about the representativeness and social constitution of the 
MO panel. For Jeffrey, the original MO was a social movement of the radicalised lower middle 
class.36 For Hinton, while not all the original panellists were lower middle class, that group 
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was certainly over-represented, along with people from London and the South East, and 
people of the Left.37 To address these concerns, we sampled within the panel. Information 
about age, gender, occupation and place of residence was available for all panellists. We 
sampled 60 respondents for each directive, seeking to include a range of responses from 
people holding a range of social and geographical positions in British society. For the 
Table 1. selected mass observation directives.
Code Date Relevant question/task
Number of 
responses
sxmoa1/3/84 Feb/mar 1945 (5) What would you say is your normal conversational 
attitude when talk gets round to each of the following 
groups of people: (a) clergymen; (b) politicians; (c) 
doctors; (d) advertising agents; (e) lawyers; and (f ) 
scientists
161
sxmoa1/3/86 may/Jun 1945 (1) please report at intervals on the election campaign in 
your constituency and people’s feelings about it. (4) 
What is your present attitude to: (a) the Conservative 
party; (b) the Labour party; (c) the Liberal party; (d) the 
Communist party; and (e) the Commonwealth party. (5) 
What would you say are the chief points in the Liberal 
party policy, and how would you say their policy differed 
from the Labour and Conservative party policies, 
respectively?
98
sxmoa1/3/88 nov 1945 (1a) how much interest do you and other people you know 
take in municipal elections? how important do you think 
they are? Did you vote in your municipal election last 
month? if not, why not, and if so, describe your reason 
for voting as you did. (1b) Do you consider your local 
council to be a good or bad one? Why?
160
sxmoa1/3/102 Jun 1947 (1) Give in as much detail as you like your views on recent 
pronouncements of policy by each of the political parties 
and by government. arrange in this order: (a) Labour 
party; (b) Conservative party; (c) Liberal party; (d) 
Communist party; and (e) Government. Write this 
without referring to any pamphlets, etc. you may have 
about the house, and, if you haven’t been following 
political party policies at all, say so. (2) When you have 
finished Q1, if you have any recent political party 
publications in the house which you have already read, 
please refer to them and describe your reactions to them 
in detail, saying which parts or points in them especially 
affect you and how
420
sxmoa1/3/121 may 1949 (3) What is your attitude to the principle of obedience to a 
‘party line’ (regardless of the political colour of the party) 
in the case of: (a) members of parliament; (b) rank and 
file members of a political party
476
sxmoa1/3/123 aug 1949 (1) Do you intend at the moment to vote the same way at 
the next parliamentary elections as you did at the last? if 
not, please give reasons in detail. in all cases, please let 
us know how you voted last time (if you did vote then) 
and how you intend to vote next time. (2) regardless of 
his political beliefs, how effectively do you think the mp 
for your constituency represents you in parliament?
351
sxmoa1/3/113 Jul 1950 (4) how do you feel about: (a) atlee; (b) Churchill; (c) Bevin; 
and (d) Cripps?
369
sxmoa1/3/116 nov 1950 (2) Which political party do you most of all sympathise 
with a present? Give an account of the development of 
your feelings about politics and of your political outlook 
and sympathies
336
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purposes of this article, we collected 480 responses to 8 directives, which amounted to 705 
sides of A4 paper (typed and single-spaced).
More importantly, our analytical approach reduced the significance of the social consti-
tution of the panel. Following Hinton, we did not read the responses as representative of 
understandings of people in general or of particular genders, age groups, occupational 
groups or regions. Hinton argues that MO panellists are unique and not representative of 
broader society.38 Instead, he suggests how these particularly reflective people provide 
access to the cultural world they and others inhabit—a world of newspapers, advice manuals, 
novels, films etc.; a world of discourse; a world of raw materials from which people in general 
construct their own unique selfhoods.39 Hinton advocates what might be called a ‘vertical’ 
approach to analysis, whereby individual contributors are followed over a series of contri-
butions to MO. He argues that by focusing on the life histories of individuals and ‘paying 
attention to their self-fashioning, we may have come closer to glimpsing those deeply per-
sonal processes from which history’s vast impersonal forces are, in the end, constructed’.40
Our approach seeks to learn from Hinton, but our starting point was a little different. 
Rather than focusing on the construction of selfhood and the democratisation of everyday 
life, we were searching for shared understandings, expectations and judgements regarding 
formal politics. We wanted to establish these for certain moments of contemporary British 
history. These objectives demanded a more ‘horizontal’ approach to analysis, focused on as 
many contributors as possible, from as many social and geographical positions as possible, 
and the stories and categories they held in common with each other—and, plausibly, with 
other citizens too (in their families, friendship networks, workplaces and so on). For the 
cultural resources found in the writing of MO panellists did not exist in a vacuum, but were 
drawn from what LeMahieu describes as ‘a common culture’, which by the 1930s circulated 
across music, newspapers, literature, cinema, radio and advertising. This common culture 
provided a shared frame of reference in which individuals from widely divergent groups 
could develop common understandings.41
The focus of this paper is the systematic analysis of MO directive responses. We believe 
that such responses tell us what citizens drew from LeMahieu’s common culture. But later 
in the paper, we discuss findings from this single source in relation to findings from existing 
studies of newspapers, literature, cinema, etc. from the time. We also acknowledge some 
limitations of the horizontal approach we take to the MO data. In seeking commonalities, it 
is likely to downplay ambiguity and complexity in the MO material. By not following indi-
viduals, it is likely to downplay the role of individual agency in social change. We have sought 
to keep these limitations in mind during analysis and interpretation. For example, we have 
read transcripts not only for shared cultural resources but also for how panellists interact 
with such categories as individuals. We have taken more than brief snapshots using eight 
directives across a period of five years. Most importantly, we have not sought representation 
but have instead read for the cultural world inhabited by panellists; the discursive resources 
available to them from which unique selfhood might be constructed, but also from which 
popular understanding might be constructed.
In post-structuralism, narratives, storylines, subject positions, etc. sometimes fit together 
into discursive repertoires or higher level discourses.42 Cognitive anthropology provides a 
similar framework, with prototypical entities, roles and events sometimes combining with 
daily experiences to make up worldviews or folk theories.43 We follow these compatible and 
in some ways overlapping approaches and read the MO material not only for cultural 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
2:0
5 0
1 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
448  J. MOSS ET AL.
resources but also for the cultural models or folk theories citizens fashion from both cultural 
resources and daily experiences, and use to guide their behaviour. Political scientists have 
recently sought to identify folk theories of democracy among citizens using survey ques-
tions.44 We argue that folk theories of democracy are seen more easily, and in all of their 
richness, in the qualitative data collected by MO.
In some respects, our approach is akin to that of Gazeley and Langhamer, who read MO 
materials for ‘proverbs, truisms, and everyday episteme’ by which respondents constructed 
and expressed their views on happiness.45 The writing which for Gazeley and Langhamer 
can be used to construct ‘meaning of life frameworks’, we believe can be used to establish 
folk theories of democracy.46 The remainder of this article adopts this approach to seek a 
better understanding of democratic engagement in the immediate post-war period. We 
seek to identify the cultural resources MO panellists used to construct understandings, expec-
tations and judgements of democracy. Rather than simply suggesting that Britain has ‘always 
had an anaemic political culture’, we show how citizens shared quite distinct understandings 
of politics and democracy in the immediate post-war period.47
Stories of democracy, politicians and party politics
The 1945 General Election was rather unusual in some respects. It had been ten years since 
the last election and many citizens were voting for the first time at the end of a war against 
spreading totalitarianism. Unsurprisingly, many respondents to MO shared the story that 
democracy was important when they wrote about formal politics. One prominent category 
that helped in constituting this narrative, found across multiple responses to the eight direc-
tives between 1945 and 1950, was the duty to vote and to take an interest in democracy. 
Duty was a norm panellists mobilised in their writing: ‘I feel it is a duty to vote in a democratic 
country’ or ‘my interest in party politics (so far as it goes) is a matter of a sense of duty, not 
spontaneous’.48 Another respondent offered a similar view: ‘I believe that we are not worthy 
of democracy (the highest form of government) unless we take some interest in the way our 
community is governed. It is a Christian’s duty to vote for the system which he believes to 
be the fairest to everyone’.49 Panellist 2818 had ‘gotten to the stage when I vote because one 
has a duty to do so’.50 Respondents also stressed the importance of a duty to participate in 
local elections. Panellist 3120 ‘voted because of (a) duty (b) interest in public affairs’.51 Another 
respondent noted how ‘There seems to be a general feeling (justified I think) that it is one’s 
duty to vote’.52 For panellist 2703, ‘I think it is the duty of [each] elector to inform himself or 
herself about the issues at stake, and if he or she can come to a decision about the matter, 
to use the vote’.53
Many respondents connected this duty of citizenship to a storyline about the apathetic 
masses. Panellist 1095 ‘attach[ed] much importance to local elections and regret[ted] apa-
thy’.54 Panellist 1974 reported in her election diary that she overheard a Tory supporter say 
‘we’ll win this election with the apathy of the people’.55 Another respondent was ‘disap-
pointed to find I wasn’t on the register this time […] I heard around the village about the 
elections. Complete apathy, apparently’.56 Panellist 2511 observed how ‘there is already a 
noticeable feeling of apathy, distrust, cynicism, and frustration, which spreads outside pol-
itics’.57 Writing about the local elections, respondent 2865 explained that ‘most people in 
Sutton were […] unaware an election was in progress […] The result was of course that the 
Socialists gained two seats, which were obviously due to the apathy of the local 
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Conservatives’.58 Panellist 3307 commented that ‘I am interested and so are people who are 
interested here in politics. Otherwise I find complete apathy’.59
Dutiful citizens emphasised the importance of democracy and distinguished themselves 
from the apathetic masses. Respondent 1016 reported in her election diary that ‘CWS insur-
ance agent and Labour man calls as usual. We talk politics. He talks that the Birtley council 
contains the most ignorant lot in the country. The Jew bag ignorant mouths elect whom 
they want and the rest […] are apathetic’.60 Another panellist reported how ‘Now that the 
election is over, people in the office seem quite apathetic about the results’.61 Respondent 
1644 explained that:
[M]ost rank and file members of any party have no ‘opinions’ where they are strong party mem-
bers. They chatter out slogans, clichés, and stock arguments without any background of reading 
or experience. Or so I find. These are the backbone of party politics and they are at least one 
step above the apathetic unthinking mass.62
Other respondents used the category of the indifferent or irresponsible masses to write 
about their political views. One panellist was ‘disturbed’ by the ‘vast mass of ignorant people 
[…] The voting I thought very irresponsible’, or ‘at present, numbers of people are ignorant 
and […] would vote for any fool’ or ‘this election has shown me one thing—how politically 
uninformed and immature everyone is who doesn’t make politics their special concern’.63 
Respondent 1210 regarded ‘municipal Elections as very important indeed, and have been 
heard to go on record as disapproving of those who take no interest in them’.64
A consequence of this widely shared story about democracy being important was that 
some respondents felt guilty about their lack of knowledge, interest or participation in pol-
itics. One respondent was ‘ashamed to confess I took next to no interest in the Municipal 
elections’.65 ‘I should really be attending more meetings’, wrote another panellist in his elec-
tion diary.66 When asked about their voting intention for the 1950 election, respondent 2675 
felt that ‘to abstain from voting would be really most honest—but that is generally regarded 
as a sign of indifference and bad citizenship’.67 Another panellist wrote that ‘I take less interest 
than I should. In theory I’m interested but in practice I wouldn't do anything unless it was 
made easy’.68 Respondent 2903 was ‘afraid that I have not paid very much attention recently 
to the policy of any political party’ but was keen to stress that ‘normally, I take an intelligent 
interest in politics and like to discuss such topics with people’.69 Another panellist wrote: ‘I 
do realise that they should be more important to me, but I am so little interested in politics 
and local elections do tend to become more and more “party”’.70
Our claim here is not that citizens were politically engaged or apathetic during this period. 
Instead, these quotations illustrate the prevalence of duty and apathy as categories or cul-
tural resources in the discursive repertoire available to people after the Second World War. 
Democracy was understood as something one ‘ought’ to be interested in; people ‘knew’ or 
‘realised’ they should participate. Apathy was shameful and associated with ignorance and 
irresponsibility, which many respondents were at pains to distance themselves from. This 
identification of duty as a prominent category of the period is not surprising, given the 
character of the MO panel, but it also fits the high levels of voter turnout at the time. The 
prevalence of duty in panellists’ writing also aligns with political scientists’ understandings 
of changing citizenship norms in the second half of the twentieth century. Russell Dalton 
describes the ‘good citizen’ in 1940s America as the dutiful citizen who felt they had a duty 
to vote and participate in civic life. For Dalton, duty-based norms of citizenship stimulated 
political engagement in the past but have since been replaced by alternative norms of 
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‘engaged citizenship’, which encourage more individualised and elite challenging forms of 
action.71 In Britain, Paul Whiteley similarly refers to the importance of civic duty to explain 
why older generations are currently more likely to vote in elections than younger citizens.72 
The strong presence of duty in MO panellists’ writing about democratic participation in the 
immediate post-war period makes further sense in this broader context.
If one story shared by MO panellists when they wrote about politics between 1945 and 
1950 was that democracy was important—that voting and taking an interest in politics was 
a duty—then a second story, told by numerous respondents, was that party politics was 
unnecessary. Throughout the MO material, politics—and party politics in particular—is 
repeatedly dismissed as ‘a dirty business’, ‘a game’, ‘clap-trap’, ‘eyewash’, ‘platform talk’, ‘gut-
tersnipe’, ‘petty squabbles’ and ‘mud-slinging’.73 ‘Mud-slinging’ was the most common line in 
the story circulating in the late 1940s about politics being unnecessary. One respondent 
bemoaned in her election diary how ‘there seemed to be so much mud-slinging’. Another 
commented that ‘many are tired of the mud-slinging and argument’.74 Others wrote that ‘I 
hate party mud-slinging’ or ‘I am sure this mud-slinging is not liked and gives people a bad 
view of politics’.75 Panellist 2794 enjoyed an election meeting because of the ‘absence of 
mud-slinging’.76 Other respondents were similarly ‘tired of all the accusations and counter 
accusations’ or were unimpressed with politicians who ‘spend their time justifying and 
defending themselves, or in slanging individuals’.77 For this panellist, ‘politics is a dirty game 
and largely talk anyway. General conception? Much the same as mine’.78
Associated with the storyline that party politics equates to mud-slinging was another 
line about how the 1945 General Election was unnecessary. For respondent 1165, ‘without 
exception, everyone seemed to think it was a pity to have an election at the particular time 
it took place’.79 Panellist 2974 ‘strongly disfavoured July election’, while respondent 3426 
explained: ‘most people are also sorry that there is to be an election before the end of the 
war in Japan [our] candidate is a convincing talker though he could not persuade me that 
some form of party politics was essential to government’.80 Another panellist had ‘nothing 
but condemnation for those who pressed for this election. There is no point in indulging 
ourselves in this exercise in democratic exhibitionism’.81 The line circulating in 1945 was that 
a General Election was unwarranted; the war was still going on in Japan and people had 
other things on their mind, such as this respondent who explained that ‘being a housewife 
with a job outside my home, I am too fully occupied to study politics. I am a little tired of the 
constant dissension between the parties. They seem to agree on nothing and waste time 
finding fault with each other’.82 While the end of the war represented a unique context for 
an election, many respondents also thought the election to be unnecessary because they 
viewed political debate as manufactured bickering by self-serving politicians. We continue 
to see this rejection of politics in the various characters populating MO writing on formal 
politics.
The first category to consider here is the ‘national government’. Respondent 3121 
explained that ‘National government is hoped for by many, frequently one is asked “why 
need there be parties?”’.83 When asked for her thoughts about ‘the principle of obedience to 
party line’, panellist 2899 wrote: ‘once elected to parliament, men’s politics should be rated 
second to his ability when government appointments are handed out. I am strongly in favour 
of a national government all the time’.84 Another respondent reflected on a conversation 
she had with a friend prior to the 1945 election:
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She said that she knew that the Labour party made a mess of things last time and that a national 
government had to be formed to get them out of it. She was definite in her opinion that it would 
always be better to have a national government rather than party politics.85
Panellist 3784 wrote: ‘in the hope that this is possible I shall endeavour to vote for a National 
Govt at the next election’.86 A final respondent explained that ‘I hear very many criticisms of 
the present government […] But practically never do I hear a constructive proposal attached 
to these criticisms. A national government against “this rationing”, “let’s get back to the eggs 
and bacon we used to have!”’.87
‘Coalition government’ was a second character in this popular story questioning the need 
for political conflict. Respondent 3402 reported: ‘one thing about which people of all classes 
are agreed, wherever, is that the coalition should have continued until the end of the 
Japanese war’.88 Panellist 3426 agreed: ‘most people seemed to think that it was a pity that 
the coalition Government did not continue’.89 Respondent 3388 was one of these people 
and wrote that ‘I am normally non-party, and prefer an independent, or one will stand for a 
coalition’.90 Panellist 1778 held that ‘if the Labour, Liberal, and Communist Parties could be 
blended, the result might be very good—if of course I did the blending’.91 When asked for 
an account of ‘your feelings about politics’, respondent 2675 replied:
I went to a course of lectures on current affairs (civics) then by an extremely able lecturer who 
really discussed the different points of view without showing any bias. This made me feel that 
there was so much right and so much wrong in each of the parties that there wasn't much to 
choose between them. In reaction I think I inclined then to turn against the Tories. I set myself a 
course of reading—of books setting both the point of view of each party […] but I never finished 
it. Other interests superseded politics—I was rather fed up with politics anyhow and wished we 
could be governed by a perpetual coalition.92
A third character of this narrative about politics being unnecessary was ‘the independent’ 
who was free from party politics. Respondent 3655 was ‘glad that the other three parties 
exist to moderate the worst excesses and deficiencies of the two great parties, but would 
be gladder still if there were more Independent members’.93 During the 1945 General Election 
campaign, panellist 3351 ‘filled in favour of Independent progressive’.94 Another respondent 
was disappointed by the Prime Minister: ‘not as independent as he seems to be to many’.95 
In contrast, panellist 3684 thought ‘the Labour Party have put up by far the best show. They 
have a programme of sincerity and ability and the only other people likely to get a look in 
are the independent progressives’.96 MO respondents continued to draw on this category 
when they wrote about local and municipal elections. For this panellist, ‘municipal elections 
are extremely important but I think they should not involve party on account of the lying 
propaganda both sides use […] whereas 24 Independents sitting round a table have only 
the business to be loyal to’.97 Another respondent ‘voted for two of the three independent 
candidates because they were living in my ward and I reflected they would be efficient’.98 
Panellist 1165 described his local council as ‘fairly good’ because ‘many of the members have 
no axes to grind, being quite independent people of substantial means’.99
Independent candidates, like national governments and coalition governments—and as 
opposed to party politicians—were thought to act in the public interest (which was thought 
to exist in singular form: the national or local interest). They were also thought to advance 
by ability. Respondent 2703 ‘deprecated’ the ‘importation of party politics into local affairs’ 
because ‘merit should be the sole test’.100 Panellist 1015 ‘deplore[d] greatly that politics should 
enter municipal elections’ because ‘it should be the best man or woman for the post’.101 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
2:0
5 0
1 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
452  J. MOSS ET AL.
Respondent 2471 ‘biased my vote to keep party politics out of the district’ and voted for the 
‘men whom I thought most capable’.102 It was declared by one panellist that ‘party politics 
warps the judgement of clever men’.103
Throughout the MO materials, we find respondents writing of ‘best men’ who are ‘capable’, 
elected on ‘merit’ and ‘have only the business to be loyal to’. This panellist explained: ‘once 
elected to parliament, men’s politics should be rated second to his ability when government 
appointments are handed out’.104 Ahead of the 1950 election, another panellist wrote that 
‘I shall probably vote for the man I consider the best candidate irrespective of party’.105 Like 
independent politicians, coalition governments were thought to advance by ability. One 
respondent wrote that ‘I don’t like party politics. We had the best men for the job regardless 
of party in the war. Why can’t we have the same during peace?’.106 For panellist 1016: ‘If only 
we could have a govt of the best men from all parties!!! And there are some good ones’.107 
For another respondent: ‘Above all I should prefer government by the best of all parties, not 
a “tory” government or a Labour government—the times demand it, the best brains we have 
working for the country, not a party’.108
A final character in this story of party politics being so much unnecessary mud-slinging, 
who for many panellists embodied the governor of ability, independently working in the 
national interest, was ‘the statesman’. Different panellists perceived different politicians as 
‘statesmen’. Respondent 2817 wrote of Ernest Bevin: ‘I can’t help admiring him as a statesman 
while disliking him as a man’.109 Panellist 3808 described Churchill as ‘an excellent statesman’ 
and respondent 4191 explained Churchill’s ‘actions in this very latest crisis show a real states-
manship’.110 Respondent 3648 believed ‘Attlee [to have] everyone’s respect for his sincerity, 
intellect and real statesman like qualities’.111 Conversely, panellist 3648 wrote of Churchill: 
‘no trace of statesmanship, nothing but a ranting party man’, while respondent 1688 
described Attlee as ‘a very uninspiring statesman’.112 These quotes tells us less about which 
politicians were perceived to be (or not be) statesman, and reveal more about the prevalence 
of ‘statesmanship’ as an ideal type in the criteria citizens used to judge politicians more 
broadly. We continue to see this in panellists’ writing about politicians as a class. For example, 
Respondent 2247’s normal conversational attitude towards politicians was ‘self-seeking […] 
or statesmen’. Panellist 3960 similarly described the politicians listed by MO (see Table 1, row 
8) as holding ‘one thing in common—and a very important thing and that is they are all 
sincere […] they are all statesman as distinct from politicians’.113 Finally, respondent 3479 
reflected on how ‘the Government, and certainly the present one, has always very many 
shortcomings and see no sign of being really overcome, or likely to be, for we would need 
indeed an inspired body of mature and supremely wise statesmen (I almost went too high 
and said “Philosophers”) for that’.114
As we have indicated, this final narrative—politics is unnecessary—turned on a line that 
one general interest existed, or at least that interests were shared by a majority. In this view, 
democracy would function more effectively should politicians possess the ability and char-
acter to recognise these shared interests and put them ahead of party interests. As one 
respondent put it: ‘A statesmen must put the real need of his country first […] A really great 
man recognises universal greatness and has universal aims’.115 Many panellists judged pol-
iticians and parties from this perspective. Respondent 2511 judged ‘the member for whom 
I voted, I think to be on the whole quite effective. I think he is conscientious and has the 
interests of most of the people in his constituency at heart’.116 Panellist 2895 wrote that his 
MP for Boscastle was ‘entirely popular and seems sincerely devoted […] to the local 
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interests’.117 Ahead of the 1950 General Election, respondent 2576 preferred the Liberal Party 
‘Chiefly because both other parties seem to represent sections of the community and not 
the interests of the country as a whole’.118 Panellist 2921 would not vote for Labour because 
they ‘allow political philosophy and expediency to usurp the place of the common economic 
good’. Respondent 3653 judged that Labour ‘seem to be too class conscious, instead of 
running the business of the country for the benefit of the country as a whole’.119 Alternatively, 
panellist 2895 ‘voted Labour at the last election out of a feeling of loyalty to see the party 
which I had regarded […] to have the welfare of the country most at heart’.120
We are now in a position to summarise the discursive repertoire available to people when 
thinking and writing about formal politics in the immediate post-war period. It was made 
up of two main stories. The first was that democracy was important. This was constituted by 
the norm of duty to participate. The second was that politics was unnecessary. Three lines 
made up this second narrative: that party politics was just mud-slinging; that the 1945 
General Election was particularly unnecessary (in the context of continuing peace negotia-
tions in Europe and war against Japan); and that government was best done by those capable 
of working in what was perceived to be a singular local or national interest. Characters 
populating this last storyline included the national government, the coalition government, 
the independent politician and the statesman.
Such cultural resources were used by MO panellists to construct and express their under-
standings, expectations and judgements of democracy and formal politics. As argued above, 
it is plausible that such categories were used in similar ways by citizens more broadly. 
Furthermore, findings from BIPO surveys of the period lend support to these claims. In 1945, 
a poll found that 42 per cent of respondents ‘disapproved of the way the election campaign 
was conducted’ because of ‘too much heckling and interference at meetings, too many 
vote-catching stunts, too much mud-slinging, [and] too little stress laid on policy by all 
parties’.121 BIPO found that a significant proportion of citizens associated party politics with 
seemingly unnecessary mud-slinging during this period. It also found that many citizens 
wished for coalition government and independent candidates. In 1942, a poll found that 48 
per cent of respondents approved of independent candidates contesting by-elections.122 In 
1943, BIPO found that 41 per cent of respondents wanted coalition government to continue 
after the war.123 And in 1944, a poll found that over a third of citizens—35 per cent—held a 
preference for ‘all party government’.124
Our argument here also fits with certain existing studies of post-war politics and popular 
culture. Steven Fielding’s more recent work suggests that films like the Ealing comedies 
expressed and articulated popular attitudes towards politics by depicting politicians as 
self-interested, and party difference as superficial.125 Films like Passport to Pimlico (1949) 
presented politics as a populist conflict between ‘Them’ and ‘Us’, where differences between 
the two main parties were interchangeable. Fielding also shows that politicians and experts 
were common figures in popular fiction such as H.G. Wells’ earlier novels and television series 
like Nigel Kneale’s The Quartermass Experiment.126 Kate Bradley’s study of the John Hilton 
Bureau of Current Affairs at the News of the World provides further evidence of citizens’ 
growing demand for experts to solve social problems on their behalf.127 Finally, MO panellists’ 
scepticism towards party politics and belief in a singular national interest makes sense in 
the context of J.B. Priestley’s commonsensical cultural dissent of the period. According to 
LeMahieu, Priestley’s universal values and criticism of self-interested elites embodied Britain’s 
common culture in the 1930s.128 These existing studies of popular culture, alongside the 
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survey data from BIPO, illustrate how the storylines and categories identified in this section 
circulated more broadly in post-war British society, and were not simply invented by MO 
panellists. The discursive repertoire we describe in this paper provides a historically specific 
shape to what Fielding has labelled as ‘the latent and formless force’ of anti-party feeling 
located in ‘the dark corners of public life’ during the 1940s.129
A preference for stealth democracy
Anti-party feeling and preferences for independent MPs and coalition government are not 
entirely novel findings. Fielding described 1942 as ‘the movement away from party’.130 For 
Fielding, Labour annexed anti-party feeling and won the election by appealing to ‘the people’ 
and the nation, rather than class and sectional interests. People voted for Labour without 
enthusiasm and because they promised social and economic reform that would benefit 
them individually. Conversely, Geoffrey Field argues that anti-party feeling has been exag-
gerated and popular support for independents was symptomatic of dissatisfaction with how 
the Conservatives handled the war. Preference for coalition government represented a ‘stra-
tegic choice’ for voters who thought Labour would not win a majority. For Field, ‘the mood 
in 1942 was less anti-political than a demand for a different type of politics’.131 Labour were 
not the passive beneficiaries of public hostility towards Conservativism and played a major 
role in determining their own success.
Fielding and Field focus on the implications of (anti-)party feeling for the election result. 
We focus on its implications for political support and disaffection, arguing that rejection of 
party politics in the immediate post-war period was expressive of the cultural model or folk 
theory of democracy suggested by the discursive repertoire identified in the previous sec-
tion. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s writing on stealth democracy provides a useful framework 
in which to develop this argument.132 In focus groups and surveys, completed around the 
turn of the twenty-first century, they found a belief prevalent across America that citizens 
have broadly the same goals—understood as ‘the common good’ or ‘the silent majority’—
and all debate, deliberation, deal-making and compromise (i.e. politics) are therefore unnec-
essary and generated by special interest lobbying and self-serving politicians. For citizens 
listened to by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, government could just be technical in character: 
management by neutral experts or business people. So in contemporary America, politics 
is thought to be unnecessary, politicians are thought to be self-serving, and independent 
experts or business people are thought to be needed for government. Proponents of stealth 
democracy reject both strongly partisan-based representative democracy and participatory 
models of democracy emphasising active citizenship. Instead, they endorse decision-making 
based on objective knowledge and independent expertise.
As we have seen, in Britain around the middle of the last century, politics was thought to 
be unnecessary, politicians were thought to be self-serving and those believed to be needed 
were independents, statesmen, coalitions and national governments. We see citizens believ-
ing in democracy but wanting to leave government to experts. They may not have used the 
precise term of ‘experts’—in a period when it was not commonly used at all, at least compared 
to the last few decades—but they did want government by people of ability and independ-
ence: the ‘best candidates’, ‘best men’, ‘clever men’ and ‘best brains’ found in the quotations 
of the previous section, who are ‘wise’, ‘capable’, of ‘merit’, without ‘bias’ and ‘loyal to the public 
interest’.133 The key difference from the current period is that, instead of a preference for 
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experts from beyond the world of formal politics, there was a belief that some elected rep-
resentatives possessed the ability and independent judgement to resolve problems on behalf 
of citizens.
This argument contributes to existing research on the rise of expertise in early and 
mid-twentieth-century Britain. G.R. Searle’s history of the National Efficiency Movement 
identifies a growing cross-party desire for state and scientific planning in the national interest 
in response to concerns around Britain’s decline as a major power after the Boer War.134 
Arthur Marwick claims the formation of bodies such as Political and Economic Planning and 
the Next Five years Group symbolised the emergence of ‘middle opinion’ in the 1930s. 
Marwick credits such groups with prompting a shift in political thought from the polarised 
party politics of the 1920s towards consensus over applying disinterested scientific methods 
to social and economic problems, and rational planning of national resources led by profes-
sionals and experts.135 Keith Middlemas argues that British politics was transformed in the 
inter-war period by the transfer of power from Parliament and political parties to industrial 
associations that were increasingly positioned as independent experts capable of managing 
the competing demands of capital and labour in the national interest.136 Finally, Harold 
Perkin argues that growth of middle-class occupations in the inter-war period prefigured 
the professionalisation of society after the war when ability and expertise became the only 
respectable justifications for recruitment to positions of power and responsibility.137
Our contribution here is to demonstrate how this gathering interest in rationality, state 
planning and independent expertise in early twentieth-century Britain was expressed in 
citizens’ understandings of democracy by the late 1940s. In this respect, our argument also 
connects to Hilton et al.’s research on the politics of expertise after the Second World War.138 
They hold that political participation changed after 1945 from voting and membership of 
political parties to involvement with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This was the 
result of two processes. First, the professionalisation of politics meant that citizens placed 
their trust in bodies of experts better positioned to make cases on behalf of citizens regarding 
complex issues. Second, the privatisation of politics meant that citizens constructed their 
own personal manifestos of complaints, causes and commitments, before joining and sup-
porting groups working on those particular issues. Our argument is that in 1945–1950, the 
professionalisation of British society was in its relatively early stages and so citizens could 
still look to politicians for resolution of increasingly complex problems. There was a desire 
for expertise among British citizens at this time, but it was commonly expressed in prefer-
ences for independent politicians of ability. In the following decades, it would become 
expressed in support for professionalised NGOs.
Returning to the question of anti-politics in the twenty-first century, we find historical 
continuity regarding stealth understandings of politics in Britain. Stoker and Hay show stealth 
attitudes are prevalent in the current period.139 So what has changed? It may be that citizens 
used to want experts to govern but could imagine politicians as those experts (in the form 
of independents, statesmen, coalitions, and national governments). Today, we suggest, cit-
izens want experts to govern but struggle to imagine politicians as experts for at least three 
reasons. First, the continued professionalisation of society has meant that citizens today can 
readily imagine experts beyond Parliament—in NGOs, for example—more than was possible 
in the late 1940s. Second, the prevalence of career politicians in Parliament today, in contrast 
to the politicians of previous periods who often had successful careers outside of politics, 
may lead citizens to view them as lacking in experience and the competencies developed 
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in life beyond private school, Oxbridge and Westminster. Third, as we show elsewhere, pol-
iticians have found it increasingly difficult to perform their expertise as long radio speeches 
and local political meetings have been replaced by modernised political campaigning and 
media reporting.140
Stoker and Hay use the term ‘stealth populism’ to describe the orientation of citizens 
towards formal politics at the beginning of the twenty-first century.141 Citizens think democ-
racy is important but also that most people agree on what should be done by government. 
They find party politics to be unnecessary and view government as primarily a technical 
exercise in administering the will of the people. What makes this orientation populist is that 
citizens view politicians as poorly placed to be those technicians working on behalf of the 
people. They view politicians instead as corrupt elites working on behalf of their cronies (and 
against the interests of the people). Of course, populism has a long history in British political 
culture. For example, Fielding identifies populism of this kind in commercial feature films of 
the post-war period.142 But what we find in the MO material is that, despite the presence of 
such populism in films of the time, citizens for the most part called for experts from within 
the world of formal politics. They called for independent candidates, statesmen, coalitional 
governments and national governments. In this view, populism may be derived from 
endemic tensions at the heart of democracy, and may be particularly visible in the current 
period, but was tempered in the late 1940s by an imagination of certain politicians and 
political arrangements as potentially working in the interests of the people.143
In this article, we have revisited the question of democratic engagement in post-war 
Britain in a context of current debates about declining political support and rising political 
disaffection. We systematically reanalysed the raw data collected by MO and thus provided 
a significant methodological advance on previous studies of political engagement based 
on MO material. Our findings lead us to question certain common accounts and theories. 
Post-war Britain was neither a golden age for democratic engagement nor a period charac-
terised by apathy. Citizens were neither particularly deferential in their attitudes towards 
politicians nor particularly partisan in their attitudes towards formal politics. By focusing on 
the categories used by citizens, we have shown that many people did not operate with 
binaries of individual and collective interests, or private and public concerns. They imagined 
one public interest—the national or local interest—best served by independent and capable 
leaders. They held something akin to a stealth model of democracy. This interpretation, 
bolstered by existing studies of duty, populism and expertise in twentieth-century Britain, 
helps explain the apparent paradox of the immediate post-war period when support for 
representative democracy accompanied hostility towards politicians and parties. It may also 
help explain political disaffection in the current period.
Notes
1.  Stoker et al., Prospects for Citizenship; Hansard Society, Audit of Political Engagement 11.
2.  Steve Richards, writing in The Independent, 21 November 2014; James Landale, writing for BBC 
News Online, 10 November 2014.
3.  Fielding, ‘The Permanent Crisis of Party’.
4.  Inglehart, Modernisation and Postmodernisation; Black, Redefining British Politics; Hilton et al., 
Politics of Expertise.
5.  For example Jefferys, Politics, 90, Lawrence, Electing our Masters, 133, 140 and 141.
6.  Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
2:0
5 0
1 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
CONTEMPORARy BRITISH HISTORy  457
7.  Lawrence, Electing Our Masters, 134.
8.  In 1951, the Conservative party had 2.5 million members and Labour had 4.9 million affiliated 
trade union members and 876,000 individual party members. Lawrence, Electing our Masters, 
139.
9.  Denver et al., Elections.
10.  See: Morgan, Labour in Power; Addison, The Road to 1945.
11.  Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism.
12.  Norris, Critical Citizens; Dalton, Good Citizen.
13.  Inglehart, Modernisation.
14.  Dalton and Wattenburg, Parties without Partisans; Mair, Party System Change.
15.  Fielding et al., England Arise.
16.  Fielding, ‘What Did the People Want?’, 639.
17.  Fielding, ‘Ken Loach’s Spirit of 45’ is a Fantasy’, The Guardian, 8 March 2013.
18.  Fielding et al., 212–213.
19.  Fielding, ‘What Did the People Want?’, 632.
20.  Fielding et al., England Arise.
21.  Hinton, ‘1945 and the Apathy School’.
22.  Field, Blood Sweat and Toil.
23.  Sloman, ‘Rethinking a Progressive Moment’.
24.  Field, Blood Sweat and Toil.
25.  McKibbin, Parties and the People.
26.  Jefferys, Politics, 5 and 121–122.
27.  Ibid., 5.
28.  Jefferys, Politics, 69, 70, 80, and 112.
29.  Beers, ‘Whose Opinion’.
30.  Fielding, England Arise, 5; Jefferys, Politics, 3.
31.  Jeffrey, Mass Observation.
32.  See ‘The Documents’ at MO Online.
33.  MacClancy, ‘Brief Encounter’.
34.  See Savage, ‘Affluence and Social Change’, 458–459; Hinton, Nine Wartime Lives, 17–18.
35.  See MO, Voters’ Choice, 13.
36.  Jeffrey, Mass Observation.
37.  Hinton, The Mass Observers.
38.  Hinton, Nine Wartime Lives, 17.
39.  Ibid. 17.
40.  Ibid. 205.
41.  LeMahieu, Culture for Democracy.
42.  Fischer and Gottweis, Argumentative Turn.
43.  Lakoff, Moral Politics.
44.  Stoker and Hay, ‘Understanding and Challenging’.
45.  Gazeley and Langhamer, ‘Meaning of Happiness’, 166.
46.  Ibid., 161.
47.  Jefferys, Politics.
48.  SxMOA1/3/88, 3419, 32, F, Housewife, Wales, 1945; SxMOA1/3/102, 2675, F, 55, Civil Servant, 
North West, 1947.
49.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3402, 40, F, Domestic Nurse, East Midlands, 1945.
50.  SxMOA1/3/123, 2818, 44, M, Aero-fitter, West Midlands, 1949.
51.  SxMOA1/3/88, 3120, 79, M, Teacher, yorkshire, 1945.
52.  SxMOA1/3/88, 2514, 28, M, Statistician, North West, 1945.
53.  SxMOA1/3/88, 2703, 60, M, Temporary Hospital Worker, South West, 1945.
54.  SxMOA1/3/88, 1095, 69, M, Railway Draughtsman, South West, 1945.
55.  SxMOA1/3/86, 1974, 41, F, Teacher, North East, 1945.
56.  SxMOA1/3/88, 2475, 60 F, Lecturer, East of England, 1945.
57.  SxMOA1/3/86, 2511, 24, M, Forester, East of England, 1945.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
2:0
5 0
1 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
458  J. MOSS ET AL.
58.  SxMOA1/3/88, 2684, 37, M, Food Packing Manager, South East, 1945.
59.  SxMOA1/3/88, 3307, 49, F, Clerk, East of England, 1945.
60.  SxMOA1/3/86, 1016, 60, F, Housewife, North East, 1945.
61.  SxMOA1/3/86, 1346, 29, F, Technical Assistant, South East, 1945.
62.  SxMOA1/3/121, 1644, 63, F, Drama Teacher, West Midlands, 1949.
63.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3388, 45, F, Housewife, South East, 1945; SxMOA1/123, 3859, 41, M, Golf Course 
Steward, N/A; 1949 SxMOA1/3/86, 21, F, Librarian, London, 1945.
64.  SxMOA1/3/88, 1210, 28, M, Bank Clerk, South West, 1945.
65.  SxMOA1/3/88, 3361, 25, M, Farm Worker, Scotland, 1945.
66.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3207, 39, M, N/A, Scotland, 1945.
67.  SxMOA1/3/123, 2675, 57, F, Civil Servant, North West, 1949.
68.  SxMOA1/3/88, 1478, 24, M, Student Draughtsman, South East, 1945.
69.  SxMOA1/3/102, 2903, 32, M, youth Leader, Wales, 1947.
70.  SxMOA1/3/88, 3034, 46, F, Research Laboratory Assistant, London, 1945.
71.  Dalton, The Good Citizen.
72.  Whitely, Political Participation, 46.
73.  SxMOA1/3/84, 1048, 48, F, Teacher, East of England, 1945; SxMOA1/3/84, 2886, 29, F, Shop 
Assistant, yorkshire; SxMOA1/3/86, 3402, 40, F, Domestic Nurse, East Midlands, 1945; 
SxMOA1/3/102, 1079, 56, F, Teacher, Wales, 1947; SxMOA1/3/102, 2708, 53, M, Jewellers 
Proprietor, East Midlands, 53; SxMOA1/3/86, N/A, F, Weaver, yorkshire, 1945; SxMOA1/3/86, 
1622, 71, M, Clergyman in Borstal, West Midlands, 1945; SxMOA1/3/86, 3419, 32, F, Housewife, 
Wales, 1945.
74.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3419, 32, F, Housewife, Wales, 1945; SxMOA1/3/86, 2384, 30, M, N/A, North West.
75.  SxMOA1/3/84, 3388, 54, F, Housewife, South East, 1945; SxMOA1/3/86, 1165, 34, M, Electrical 
Engineer, South East, 1945.
76.  SxMOA1/3/86, 2794, 24, M, Civil Engineer, East of England, 1945.
77.  SxMOA1/3/86, 1056, 63, F, Teacher, South East, 1945; SxMOA1/3/86, 1165, 37, M, Food Packing 
Manager, South East 1945.
78.  SxMOA1/3/86, 2794, 24, M, Civil Engineer, East Midlands, 1945; SxMOA1/3/86, 3426, 46, F, School 
Medical Inspector, yorkshire, 1945.
79.  SxMOA1/3/86, 1165, 34, M, Electrical Engineer, South East 1945.
80.  SxMOA1/3/86, 2794, 24, M, Civil Engineer, East Midlands, 1945; SxMOA1/3/86, 3426, 46, F, School 
Medical Inspector, yorkshire, 1945.
81.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3484, 37, M, Commercial Traveller, West Midlands, 1945.
82.  SxMOA1/3/102, 3432, 63, F, Domestic Worker, East of England, 1947.
83.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3121, 62, F, Teacher, South East, 1945.
84.  SxMOA1/3/121, 2899, 34, F, Secretary, North West, 1949.
85.  SxMOA1/3/86, 1346, 29, F Technical Assistant, N/A, 1945.
86.  SxMOA1/3/116, 3784, 65, M, Chemist, 1950.
87.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3121, 62, F, Teacher, South East, 1945.
88.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3402, 40, F, Domestic Nurse, East Midlands, 1945.
89.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3426, 46, F, School Medical Inspector, yorkshire, 1945.
90.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3388, 54, F, Housewife, South East, 1945.
91.  SxMOA1/3/116, 1478, 29, M, Draughtsman, North West, 1950.
92.  SxMOA1/3/116, 2675, 59, F, Civil Servant, North West, 1950.
93.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3655, N/A, M, Journalist, Scotland, 1945.
94.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3351, 26, M, Clerk, yorkshire, 1945.
95.  SxMOA1/3/86, 1980, 65, F, Nurse, South East, 1945.
96.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3684, N/A, F, Weaver, yorkshire, 1945.
97.  SxMOA1/3/88, 1644, 59, F, Housewife, West Midlands, 1945.
98.  SxMOA1/3/88, 3419, 32, F, Housewife, Wales, 1945.
99.  SxMOA1/3/88, 1165, 39, M, Electrical Engineer, South East, 1945.
100.  SxMOA1/3/88, 2703, 60, M, Temporary Hospital Worker, South West, 1945.
101.  SxMOA1/3/88, 1015, 70, F, Office Worker, South East, 1945.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
2:0
5 0
1 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
CONTEMPORARy BRITISH HISTORy  459
102.  SxMOA1/3/88, 2471, 30, M, Chemist, Scotland, 1945.
103.  SxMOA1/3/84, 3371, 40, F, Domestic Nurse, East Midlands, 1945.
104.  SxMOA1/3/121, 2899, 34, F, Secretary, North West, 1945.
105.  SxMOA1/3/121, 1644, 63, F, Drama Teacher, West Midlands, 1949.
106.  SxMOA1/3/86, 2576, 35, M, Manager of Textile Mile, East Midlands, 1945.
107.  SxMOA1/3/116, 1016, 63, F, Housewife, North East, 1950.
108.  SxMOA1/3/116, 3640, 36, F, Civil Servant, North West, 1950.
109.  SxMOA1/3/113, 2817, 26, M, Methodist Minister, East Midlands, 1950.
110.  SxMOA1/3/113, 3808, 50, M, Farmer, East of England, 1950.
111.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3648, N/A, F, Weaver, yorkshire, 1945; SxMOA1/3/113, 4191, 71, F, N/A, N/A, 1950.
112.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3648, N/A, F, Weaver, yorkshire, 1945; SxMOA1/3/113, 1688, 39, M, Estate Agent, 
Wales, 1950.
113.  SxMOA1/3/84, 2247, 27, M, Goods Loader, East Midlands, 1945; SxMOA1/3/113, 3960, 27, M, 
Farm Labourer, N/A, 1950.
114.  SxMOA1/3/102, 3479, 24, M, Unemployed, East of England, 1947.
115.  SxMOA1/3/86, 3648, N/A, F, Weaver, yorkshire, 1945.
116.  SxMOA1/3/123, 2511, 28, M, Forestry Commission, East of England, 1949.
117.  SxMOA1/3/113, 2859, 62, F, Teacher, South West, 1949.
118.  SxMOA1/3/116, 2576, 40, M, Manager of Textile Mill, East Midlands, 1950.
119.  SxMOA1/3/113, 2921, 27, M, Commercial Traveller, East Midlands, 1950; SxMOA1/3/102, 3653, 
66, M, Farmer, East of England.
120.  SxMOA1/3/116, 2895, 63, F, Music Teacher, South West, 1950.
121.  BIPO, July 1945.
122.  BIPO, April 1942.
123.  BIPO, November 1943.
124.  BIPO, August 1944.
125.  Fielding, ‘Mirror for England’.
126.  Fielding, State of Play, 146.
127.  Bradley, ‘All Human Life’.
128.  LeMahieu, Culture for Democracy, 318.
129.  Fielding, ‘Mirror for England’, 128.
130.  Fielding, ‘The Second World War’.
131.  Field, Blood, Sweat and Toil.
132.  Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy.
133.  Google Books Ngram Viewer.
134.  Seale, Quest for National Efficiency.
135.  Marwick, ‘Middle Opinion’.
136.  Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society.
137.  Perkin, Rise of Professional Society.
138.  Hilton et al., The Politics of Expertise.
139.  Stoker and Hay, ‘Understanding and Challenging’.
140.  Clarke et al., ‘Changing Encounters’.
141.  Stoker and Hay, ‘Understanding and Challenging’.
142.  Fielding, ‘Mirror for England’.
143.  Stoker and Hay, ‘Understanding and Challenging’; Fielding ‘Mirror for England’.
Acknowledgements
The authors also wish to thank staff at the Mass Observation Archive for their help, advice and per-
mission to use materials. The paper was improved in response to comments at various seminars and 
workshops during 2015 and 2016, and from the editor and reviewers, for which the authors are also 
very grateful.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
2:0
5 0
1 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
460  J. MOSS ET AL.
Funding
The research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number ES/L007185/1].
Notes on contributors
Jonathan Moss is a senior research assistant at the University of Southampton. He recently completed 
his PhD on ‘Women, workplace militancy and political consciousness in Britain, 1968–1981’.
Nick Clarke is an associate professor of Human Geography at the University of Southampton. He is the 
author of Globalising Responsibility (2011, Blackwell, with Clive Barnett, Paul Cloke and Alice Malpass) 
and numerous papers on political and urban geography. He is the principal investigator for the ESRC-
funded project, ‘Popular Understandings of Politics in Britain, 1937–2015’.
Will Jennings is the professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Southampton. 
He is the author of Olympic Risks (2012, Palgrave Macmillan), Policy Agendas in British Politics (2013, 
Palgrave Macmillan, with Peter John, Anthony Bertelli and Shaun Bevan) and numerous papers on 
public policy and political behaviour.
Gerry Stoker is the professor of Politics and Governance at the University of Southampton and 
Centenary Research Professor at the University of Canberra. He is the author of almost 50 books, 
including Why Politics Matters (2006, Palgrave Macmillan), Prospects for Citizenship (2010, Bloomsbury) 
and the Relevance of Political Science (2015, Palgrave Macmillan, with Jon Pierre and Guy Peters).
References
Addison, P. The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War. Revised ed. London: Pimlico, 1994.
Beers, L. “Whose Opinion?: Changing Attitudes towards Opinion Polling in British Politics, 1937–1964.” 
Twentieth Century British History 17, no. 2 (2006): 177–205. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/hwl009.
Bengtsson, A., and M. Mikko. “Direct Democracy and Its Critics: Support for Direct Democracy and 
‘Stealth’ Democracy in Finland.” West European Politics 32, no. 5 (2009): 1031–1048.
Black, L. Redefining British Politics: Culture, Consumerism and Participation, 1954–70. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010.
Bradley, K. “All Human Life is There’: The John Hilton Bureau of the News of the World and Advising 
the Public, 1942–1969.” The English Historical Review 129, no. 539 (2014): 888–911. doi:http://dx.doi.
org/10.1093/ehr/ceu210.
Clarke, N., W. Jennings, J. Moss, and G. Stoker, Changing Encounters, Interactions, and Judgements 
between Citizens and Politicians: Evidence from Mass Observation’s General-Election Diaries, 2016. Draft 
manuscript available from the authors (n.clarke@soton.ac.uk).
Dalton, R. J. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004.
Dalton, R. J. The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is Reshaping American Politics. Washington, 
DC: CQ Press, 2008.
Dalton, R. J., and Wattenberg. Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Denver, D., C. Carman, and R. Johns. Elections and Voters in Britain. 3rd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2012.
Field, G. Blood, Sweat and Toil: Remaking the British Working Class, 1939–1945. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011.
Fielding, S. “What Did “the People” Want? The Meaning of the 1945 General Election.” The Historical 
Journal 35, no. 03 (1992): 623–639.
Fielding, S. “The Second World War and Popular Radicalism: The Significance of the ‘Movement Away 
from Party.” History 80, no. 258 (1995): 38–58. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-229X.1995.
tb01658.x.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
2:0
5 0
1 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
CONTEMPORARy BRITISH HISTORy  461
Fielding, S. “A Mirror for England? Cinematic Representations of Politicians and Party Politics, Ca. 1944–1964.” 
The Journal of British Studies 47, no. 01 (2008): 107–128. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/522346.
Fielding, S. “The Permanent Crisis of Party.” Twentieth Century British History 21, no. 1 (2009): 102–109. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/hwp040.
Fielding, S. A State of Play: British Politics on Screen, Stage and Page, from Anthony Trollope to the Thick 
of It. London: Bloomsbury, 2014.
Fielding, S., P. Thompson, and N. Tiratsoo. England Arise! The Labour Party and Popular Politics in 1940s 
Britain. Manchester, NH: Manchester University Press, 1995.
Fischer, F., and H. Gottweis, eds. The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice. 
Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2012.
Gazeley, I., and I. Langhamer. “The Meanings of Happiness in MO’s Bolton.” History Workshop Journal 
75, no. 1 (2013): 159–189. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hwj/dbs015.
Hansard Society. Audit of Political Engagement 11: The 2014 Report. London: Hansard Society, 2014.
Hay, C. Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity, 2007.
Hibbing, J. R., and E. Theiss-Morse. Stealth Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs about How Government Should 
Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Hilton, M., J. McKay, N. Crowson, and J. Mouhot. The Politics of Expertise: How NGOs Shaped Modern 
Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Hinton, J. “‘1945 and the Apathy School.” History Workshop Journal 43 (1997): 266–273. doi:http://dx.doi.
org/10.1093/hwj/1997.43.266.
Hinton, J. Nine Wartime Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Hinton, J. The Mass Observers: A History, 1937–1949. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Inglehart, R. Modernisation and Postmodernisation: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 
Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Jefferys, K. Politics and the People: A History of British Democracy since 1918. London: Atlantic Books, 2007.
Jeffrey, T. MO: A Short History. MO Archive Occasional Paper No. 10, 1999.
Lakoff, G. Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think. 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 2002.
Lawrence, J. Electing Our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009.
LeMahieu, D. L. A Culture for Democracy: Mass Communication and the Cultivated Mind in Britain between 
the Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
MacClancy, J. “Brief Encounter: The Meeting, in Mass-Observation, of British Surrealism and Popular 
Anthropology.” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 1, no. 3 (1995): 495–512.
Mair, P. Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Marwick, A. “Middle Opinion in the Thirties: Planning, Progress and Political ‘Agreement’.” English 
Historical Review 79 (1964): 891–912. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ehr/LXXIX.CCCXI.285.
McKibbin, R. Parties and People, England 1914–1951. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Middlemas, K. Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience of the British System since 1911. London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1979.
Miliband, R. Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in the Politics of Labour. London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1961.
Morgan, K. Labour in Power, 1945–1951. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
Neblo, M., K. Esterling, R. Kennedy, D. Lazer, and A. Sokhey. “Who Wants to Deliberate—And Why?” 
American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010): 566–583. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S0003055410000298.
Norris, P. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999.
Mass Observation. The Voters’ Choice: A Special Report by MO. London: Art and Technics, 1950.
Perkin, H. The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880. Abingdon: Routledge, 1989.
Savage, M. “Affluence and Social Change in the Making of Technocratic Middle-Class Identities: 
Britain, 1939–55.” Contemporary British History 22, no. 4 (2008): 457–476. doi:http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/13619460802439366.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
2:0
5 0
1 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
462  J. MOSS ET AL.
Searle, G. R. The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899–1914. 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1971.
Sloman, P. “‘Rethinking a Progressive Moment: The Liberal and Labour Parties in the 1945 General 
Election.” Historical Research 84, no. 226 (2011): 722–744.
Stoker, G., A. Mason, and A. McGrew. Prospects for Citizenship. London: Bloomsbury, 2001.
Stoker, G. Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
Stoker, G., and C. Hay. “Understanding and Challenging Populist Negativity towards Politics: 
The Perspectives of British Citizens.” Political Studies, 22 February (2016). doi:http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/0032321715607511.
Webb, P. “Who is Willing to Participate? Dissatisfied Democrats, Stealth Democrats and Populists in the 
United Kingdom.” European Journal of Political Research 52, no. 6 (2013): 747–772.
Whiteley, P., H. Clarke, D. Sanders, and M. Stewart. “Turnout.” In Britain Votes 2001, edited by P. Norris, 
211–224. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Whitely, P. Political Participation in Britain: The Decline and Revival of Civic Culture. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
2:0
5 0
1 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
